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Three Regulatory Signals Are About to Separate Swiss Trust Companies Into Two Groups

Frédéric Sanz of FiduciaCorp argues that three converging Swiss reforms — the AMLO-FINMA revision, the LETA beneficial-ownership register and the AMLA extension — will divide trust companies by how cheaply they can prove the decisions they have made.

By

FiduciaCorp

Published

29 June 2026

Across 2026 and 2027, the cost of how a firm records its decisions stops being an internal matter and becomes a competitive one. Most boards are reading the three signals separately. The firms that read them together will move first.


Three pieces of Swiss regulation are landing in close succession, and almost everyone is treating them as three separate compliance tasks. They are not. Read together, they point in one direction, and that direction has a price tag.


On 12 May 2026, FINMA opened a consultation on a partial revision of AMLO-FINMA, running until 9 June 2026, with entry into force planned for 1 January 2027. Separately, Parliament adopted LETA in September 2025, creating a federal beneficial-ownership register, and the parallel AMLA revision is set to extend due-diligence duties to certain advisory and structuring activities, subject to the final implementing ordinances. Three signals. One message. Slowly, Swiss supervisors are moving from asking whether a firm has the right procedures on paper to checking whether it can prove, with contemporaneous records and audit trails, what it understood, decided, and did in each case.


That shift sounds technical. Its consequences are commercial.


First, the objection every experienced trustee will raise

Before the case for change, the case against it, because any trustee with twenty years behind them will raise it, and they are not wrong to.


For a long time, keeping a file thin has been good business. A decision that is not committed to a single documented rationale stays flexible. It can be revisited and explained in context when, and only when, someone actually asks.


The register does not abolish that flexibility overnight. Parliament was careful not to attach any presumption of accuracy to it, the register itself is not public, and existing entities benefit from transitional periods before they are required to comply. But that misses the practical point. The register creates a second record that supervisory and enforcement authorities can consult, within the limits the law sets, alongside the firm's own files. The flexibility survives in law.


What changes is the cost of relying on it: every position a firm takes now sits next to a federal data point someone can compare it against. Maintaining two versions that must not visibly contradict each other is more expensive, and more exposed, than recording cleanly once.


Slowly, Swiss supervisors are moving from asking whether a firm has the right procedures on paper to checking whether it can prove, with contemporaneous records and audit trails, what it understood, decided, and did in each case.



Why this is a margin question, not a compliance question

Every trust company already runs a compliance function. The question these reforms raise is not whether you comply: it is how much it costs you to prove you complied.


A firm that can instantly produce a clear, contemporaneous record of any decision possesses something rare: provable accountability. It can tell clients and their advisers, “Ask us why we did anything, and we can show you with the reasoning preserved.”


Today, when an examiner, a beneficiary’s lawyer, or an incoming auditor asks why a particular decision was taken eighteen months ago, most firms answer the same way: someone goes back through the files, reconstructs the reasoning, assembles the emails, and builds the record after the fact. That reconstruction is invisible on the balance sheet, but it is real cost: senior time, the most expensive time in the building, spent rebuilding decisions that should never have needed rebuilding.


As the reforms take effect, that cost rises in two directions at once. The question is coming up more often because continuous register reconciliation is increasingly displacing one-off checks. And the standard of the answer rises, because “we have a policy for that” no longer satisfies a supervisor who wants to see the decision itself.


Firms that capture the reasoning as the decision is made pay this cost once, almost invisibly. Firms that reconstruct pay it again every time someone asks, and they will be asked far more often after these reforms land. The gap between those two operating models is a margin gap. Over an audit cycle, it is the difference between a compliance function that scales and one that quietly eats the partners’ time.


The implementation problem is real: it is the actual work

Here is where most “AI for trustees” conversations lose serious people, and rightly so. Changing how a firm records its decisions runs into two walls: human habit, and technology that rarely delivers what its vendors promise. Anyone who has sat through an implementation knows the second wall well.


So, it is worth being precise about what this is and is not. The work is operational design first: deciding what gets captured, by whom, at which point in the existing workflow, so that nothing new is added to anyone’s day. The tool comes second, only to make it last. Buy the tool without doing the design, and you get the failure you expected. Do the design first, and the technology turns out to be the easy part.


That distinction is the difference between a project that becomes an asset and one that slowly turns into a liability.


Who this is actually for

Not every board needs to act on this in the next twelve months but firms for which the question is acute are the ones already feeling the cost: reconstruction eating senior hours, an examination cycle on the horizon, or claim exposure where defensibility will decide the outcome. For them, this is a near-term operating decision.


For the rest, it is a watching brief. The only mistake worth flagging is assuming it stays a watching brief indefinitely. The conditions are moving on a fixed calendar, and the calendar runs through 2026 into 2027.


What the early movers actually gain

A firm that can instantly produce a clear, contemporaneous record of any decision possesses something rare: provable accountability. It can tell clients and their advisers, “Ask us why we did anything, and we can show you with the reasoning preserved.”


This is not a marketing line. It is risk hygiene with a useful side effect: it shortens the hardest conversations a trustee ever has.


It also changes the conversation with the firm’s own professional-indemnity insurers. A defensible, contemporaneous record is the single most useful thing a trust company can put in front of an underwriter after a claim. Firms that have it are managing a risk their competitors are still carrying unpriced.


What separates the two groups

By the time these reforms are in force, Swiss trust companies will fall into two groups, and the line between them will not be size, heritage, or the thickness of the compliance manual.


One group will keep absorbing the rising cost of documentary flexibility as the conditions that rewarded it close: more reconstruction, slower audits, harder conversations with insurers and beneficiaries. The other will change how decisions are recorded, once, so that proof becomes a by-product of the work rather than a project that follows it. Neither is right or wrong in the abstract. They are responding differently to the same shift in conditions, and one response is about to become measurably more expensive than the other.


Which response is right for a given firm is a decision only that firm can make. But it is not primarily a legal question. It is a business one.


FiduciaCorp works with Swiss trust companies on exactly this: building decisions so the proof is part of the work, not a reconstruction after it. If this is on your 2027 agenda, it is worth a conversation before audit planning begins.


Frédéric Sanz is Founder and Director of FiduciaCorp, which develops AI governance architecture for licensed fiduciary services across multiple jurisdictions. He has over twenty years in international private client and trust administration, with senior roles at J.P. Morgan Private Bank, CSC Group, TMF Group and Rhone Trustees (formerly Pictet's trust business). He is the author of AI Unleashed for Trustees & Family Offices (2024) and holds an Executive MBA, a MAS and an MSc. Comments and correspondence: fs@fiduciacorp.com

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